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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff- Respondent 
-vs-
ROBERT C. DAVIS 
Defendant-A ppellant 
Case No. 14313 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of Burglary, a felony of the 
second degree, and Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in the Third District Court 
for the State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Robert C. Davis, was convicted by a jury of the crimes 
of Burglary and Theft on October 2, 1975, in the court of the Honorable Peter 
F. Leary and was sentenced to serve the indeterminate term provided by law 
in the Utah State Prison, namely 1-15 years and one year concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt entered against him and 
a new trial in this matter. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 2:25 p. m. on July 21, 1975, Salt Lake County, Sheriffs 
Deputy Mike Hanks was holding surveillance on an apartment complex located 
at 1840 West 6th North in Salt Lake City. From his position in a vacant house, 
he observed Defendants Thayne Walker and Robert Davis at the complex, but 
he lost sight of them when they went around in front of a building. (T. 37) 
Hanks then entered his patrol car and proceeded to 6th North, hoping to relocate 
the defendants. Unable to relocate them, he returned to the apartment complex 
and held surveillance for another ten minutes. Hanks then proceeded to 4th North 
and was driving east toward Redwood Road when he saw the defendants in a 
Volkswagen van driven by Defendant Walker, in a driveway to an apartment 
complex at 1740 West 4th North. The van remained in the driveway while Hanks' 
vehicle passed. Deputy Hanks waved to the defendants and Defendant Davis, 
who knew Hanks, waved back. Deputy Hanks then pulled his vehicle off to the 
side of the road to allow the defendants to pass, but they instead pulled over and 
parked behind his patrol car. 
Deputy Hanks and Defendant Davis, the passenger, exited their respective 
vehicles and engaged in light conversation, with Davis stating that he had been 
visiting a friend in the apartment complex. (T. 38) At this point Deputy Hanks 
instructed Davis to return to the Volkswagen and then asked Defendant Walker for 
his driver's license. Walker exited the van and produced a license. Hanks 
instructed him to remain in the van while he went back to the patrol car to check 
the license for revocations. Upon checking with the dispatcher, Deputy Hanks Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determined there were no revocations and the license was valid. (T. 39) Deputy 
Hanks then returned to the van and engaged in conversation with Defendant Walker. 
Hanks then returned to his patrol car and "radioed the city to send a city 
officer for assistance. M (Transcript of Suppression Hearing, p. 11) Deputy 
Hanks testified that he made that request because he "wanted to check the 
apartment complex to see if there was a possible burglary there. " (Id.) He 
also expressly stated that at this time he had not observed anything unusual 
about the van. (Id.) Hanks then returned to the van and asked Davis to 
step out. Davis did so and at this point Deputy Hanks observed some stereo 
equipment in the back of the van. At this time Defendant Davis remarked that 
"he didn't know anything about it (the stereo equipment)... " (T. 39) 
The two continued to engage in small talk about Davisf girl friend until 
Hanks instructed Davis to return to the van. He then went to the patrol car and 
was contacting the dispatcher to determine if the city officers were enroute 
when Officer Crokett and another Salt Lake City officer arrived. Hanks instructed 
them to watch the two defendants while he checked the aprtment complex from 
which the defendants had just come. 
He went to the apartment complex, went upstairs, and knocked on a door. 
Hanks asked the resident if he had seen two men in the apartment complex. 
The resident replied in the negative. (T. 41) Hanks then went downstairs and 
observed a partially opened door. The door was approximately a foot and a half 
open and appeared to have been forced because the wood frame appeared to have 
been splintered. Inside Hanks saw a lamp turned over and the interior of the 
apartment appeared to be in disarray. (T. 42) 
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Deputy Hanks returned upstairs and questioned the resident, with whom 
he had previously talked, concerning the occupants of the apartment below. He 
was informed that it belonged to the Talayumptuewas and the Mrs. Tal-
syumptuewa worked at the Sears warehouse. Hanks then returned to the 
location of the vehicles and placed the defendants under arrest . He then 
requested the dispatcher contact Mrs. Talayumptuewa and have her come to 
her apartment to determine if there were any missing items. 
Deputy Hanks then impounded the defendants' vehicle by calling a 
commercial towing firm which transported the van to a secured location. When 
Mrs. Talayumptuewa arrived at her apartment,an inventory of the missing items 
was prepared. Deputy Hanks then went to the County Attorney's office where 
a search warrant affidavit was prepared. A warrant to search the vehicle for 
the missing items was issued by a Salt Lake City judge. 
Defendants Walker and Davis had been simultaneously taken to the county 
jail and were incarcerated on charges of burglary and theft. 
Prior to executing the warrant for the search of the vehicle, Hanks 
contacted Mr. Talayumptuewa by telephone from the towing company's office. 
The vehicle was then searched and items of stereo equipment, listed in the 
warrant were recovered from inside the van. In response to the phone call, 
Hanks went to the apartment complex again and was given the broken tip of 
a screwdriver. (T. 44) 
Later Hanks had conversations with Mr. Talayumptuewa concerning 
additional stolen property: two silver dollars. Hanks then obtained a search 
warrant for the personal effects of Mr. Davis who was then being held in the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
two silver dollars: one from the envelope containing cash taken from Defendant 
Davis and one from the cash register of the jail. Testimony was given that 
Davis had requested Mrs. Rupelinger get change for him so he could buy-
cigarettes, which she did. (T. 83) 
At the trial the defendants moved to suppress introduction of the evidence 
(stereo equipment, tools, a piggy bank, and silver dollars) on the grounds that 
(1) it was fruit of an illegal arrest and (2) that the prosecution had introduced 
no search warrants to justify the searches that were made. These motions 
were denied and the evidence was admitted. The jury returned verdicts of 
guilty against both defendants and they were sentenced to imprisonment in the 
Utah State Prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ACTIONS OF OFFICER HANKS CONSTITUTE A SEIZURE 
OF THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT DAVIS AND THUS 
SUCH ACTIONS COME WITHIN THE PROTECTION OF THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PROHIBITING 
UNREASONABLE SEIZURES. 
A. THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS A SEIZURE 
OF HIS PERSON, AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized; 
The Constitution of the State of Utah has an almost identical provision in 
Article I, Section 14. Inherent in these two documents imposing limitations Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
upon government power is the concept of the right of the citizenry to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion. 
The State in the proceedings below has seemed to use the terms "arrest" 
and "detain" almost interchangeably, or at least in such a manner as to blur 
any distinction between the two. Perhaps this is proper, in light of the 
constitutional implications involved in both terms. However, it is necessary 
to lay a foundation, in order to make a distinction. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 20,L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868(1968) 
the Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity to examine a situation 
involving the detention of a suspect. That court stated: 
We, therefore, reject the notion that the Fourth Amendment does 
not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if 
the officers stop short of something called a "technical arrest" 
or "full blown search. " 392 U. S. at 19. 
In State v. Brads haw, 541 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1975) this Court recognized 
that provisions of both the State and Federal Consitutions are invoked in situations 
involving detentions. The Utah Court, favorably citing Terry, supra, as 
holding that arrests without a warrant may only be made upon probable cause, quote 
from the Terry opinion: 
It is quite plain that theFouith Amendment covers 'seizures' of 
the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house 
and prosecution for crime -- 'arrests ' in traditional terminology. 
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has TseizedT 
that person. 541 P. 2d at 801. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not been presented with any cases arising 
under the present "detention" statute (Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (1953); 
nevertheless, the almost exact similarity of the language of the Constitutional 
provisions involved and the fundamental policy reasons underlying such an Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interpretation should be reason enough to enable this Court to hold, as in 
Terry, that f'detentions'1 come within the scope of Constitutional protection. 
B. THE "DETENTION" OF THE DEFENDANTS BY DEPUTY HANKS 
EXCEEDED THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY STATUTE AND 
WAS THEREFORE AN "ARREST". 
Utah Code Annotated §77-13-33 (1953) as amended, entitled "Authority 
of peace officer to stop and question suspect -- Grounds", provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place whom he 
has probable cause to believe: 
(1) is in the act of committing a crime; 
(2) has committed a crime; or 
(3) is attempting to commit a crime; 
and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of 
his actions. 
This section enacted in 1967 is a legislative act providing a peace officer "with 
authority to detain a suspect temporarily for questioning and search him for 
dangerous weapons. " Section 77-13-34, which comprises the second section 
of the Act, grants the officer authority to conduct a search of the person 
for dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes he or any other person is in 
danger of life or limb. The defendant submits that this statute was enacted 
to merely grant the officer authority to make a limited detention of a person 
in public place. It was designed for situations like that in Terry, supra, where 
an experienced officer had grounds to believe a crime was about to occur. In 
Terry the officer perceived very suspicious activity and made a limited detention 
for the purpose of determining the identity of the suspects. The search of 
the person, conducted for the officer's personal safety, we& merely incident 
to that detention even though it produced the weapon, the carrying of which was a crime: 
and for which the suspect was later prosecuted. Had the officer been given a 
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i 
satisfactory explanation as to the suspect's activities so as to dispel his 
suspicions about them, and had the officer found no weapons during his limited 
search, he would have been obliged to release the individuals and allow them 
to proceed on their way. 
The intent of the Utah statute is analogous. It allows the officer to 
"stop" and "demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions." 
Upon receiving such, he is obliged to release the person at that time unless he 
has other grounds to hold him. If he indeed does have a basis for any of the 
three statutory grounds for the stop, he may arrest the person. Thus, 
it appears that the statute requires a higher standard, (i .e. "probable cause"), 
than is required by the Terry, supra, decision. 
Concerning this lesser standard the Terry opinion stated: 
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional 
propriety of an investigative "seizure" upon less than 
probable cause for purposes of "detention" and/or interrogation. 
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and 
citizens involve "seizures" of persons. Only when the officer, 
by some means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that 
a "seizure" has occurred. 392 U. S. at 20. 
The first sentence of that paragraph would seem to indicate the U. S. Supreme 
Court is of the opinion that a "detention" may be based upon a showing of less 
than probable cause. That is certainly not the issue here because: (1) the 
relevant Utah statute authorizing detention specifically requires probable cause; 
(2) the State did not attempt to justify the detention as flowing from a non-
statutory authority (if indeed there could be such) to detain on less than probable 
cause; and (3) such a concept is clearly contradictory to the remainder of the 
. .1.- nn—„_-„4^„ oc w^ii as contradictory to provisions in both 
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the U. S. and Utah constitutions requiring probable cause for seizures. 
As applied to the facts in this case, Deputy Hanks' actions certainly 
constituted a "seizure" of the defendants. He had gone well beyond the scope 
of the detention authorized by Section 77-13-33. After he had obtained the 
defendants' names, address (via the driver's license of Defendant Walker) and 
an explanation of their actions (that they had just finished visiting a friend) 
he was obliged to release them. He was not authorized to request a back-up 
unit. He was not authorized to have Davis exit the van a second time. These 
actions constituted an arrest. As per the Terry opinion, it certainly was a 
"seizure" of the person because he had, by show of authority, restrained their 
liberty. The defendants knew that Deputy Hanks was conducting some kind of 
official investigation of them based upon his actions: checking the driver's license 
or Walker, calling for the back-up unit (T. 62) and having Davis exit the 
vehicle. Certainly a reasonable person in this situation, upon observing the 
arrival of a second police unit and hearing Deputy Hanks' instruction to the 
others to "watch these guys", would perceive he was not free to leave. If he 
were, there would be no need to instruct the city officers to "watch" cue 
defendants. This cannot be construed to mean "follow them and see where they 
go"; it means (implicit with Deputy Hanks' actions) "I think these guys did 
something and I'm going to investigate. " A reasonable person would have 
believed he was in official custody at that time. There was even testimony 
that such detention by Deputy Hanks had occurred twice prior to this incident. 
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(T. 134) Such previous detention by Officer Hanks, although clearly improper, 
were not the subject of any assertion of right to privacy or to be free from such 
an unreasonable search because at those instances such "detentions" produced 
no criminal charges. 
At the trial, the prosecution attempted to rely on Utah Code Ann. 
§77-13-33 (1953) as amended, to authorize the arrest of the defendants. However, 
that section was specifically enacted to allow police officers some authority 
to stop and detain suspected persons long enough to allow the officer to make 
inquiry into the person's activities. The section cannot be construed to allow 
an unlimited detention so long as necessary for the officer to conduct an 
investigation of the area for possible criminal activities. Defendants in the 
present case gave a reasonable explanation for their presence at the complex; 
they had been visiting a friend. The time of day was not unusual. Their 
conduct was not unusual. There was no possible reason for the officer to 
continue to hold them any longer than was necessary to determine the reasons 
for their being in the area. Once he received their answer, which on its face 
is satisfactory in light of all the circumstances involved, the detention should 
have ceased. 
Likewise inapplicable is any reliance the State may place upon the 
officer's authority to stop the vehicle under provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§41-1-17 (c) (1953) as amended. Deputy Hanks, although he did check the 
driver's license of Walker, did not stop the vehicle for any operational violations. 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DEFENDANT DAVIS WAS 
PLACED UNDER "ARREST" AT THE TIME OF DEPUTY 
HANKS' RETURN FROM THE APARTMENT COMPLEX AND 
AT THAT TIME FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
ATTACHED. 
There was testimony by Deputy Hanks (T. 42) that he placed the two 
defendants under arrest upon his return from the apartment complex. On 
cross-examination, Deputy Hanks explained his actions as that of searching 
the individuals, handcuffing them, and indicating to them they were under 
arrest for burglary. (T. 63) Clearly, the State must concede that a seizure 
had occurred at that point. Such a seizure comes within the scope of the 
United States and State Constitutions (Terry, supra, p. 6) and this Court must 
determine whether the officer had probable cause for such arrest . 
POINT II. 
THE ARREST AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS 
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND THEREFORE VIOLATED 
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §77-13-33 (1953 as amended). 
As previously noted, both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution require "probable cause" for the issuance of a warrant to search 
or to seize. Although there is a judicial preference for the issuance of a warrant, 
the courts have realized that a warrant is not per se required for a seizure. 
However, if the intent of these Constitutional provisions is to be followed, the 
standard of probable cause ought to be the same for seizures which do not have 
judicial approval through a warrant. The concept of probable cats e involves 
more than just suspicion. There must be evidence which would "warrant Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reub n Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a man of reasonable caution in the belieftT that a crime has been committed. 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 at 162. A relaxation of this standard 
for probable cause would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the 
officer's whim or caprice. r t Erinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1948) 
at 176. . 
Utah Code Annotated §77-13-33, (1953)as amended, as discussed previously, 
provides authorization for an officer to stop a person in a public place and demand of 
him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions when the officer 
"has reasonable cause to believe" he: 
(1) is in the act of committing a crime; 
(2) has committed a crime; or 
(3) is attempting to commit crime. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-13-3 (1953) as amended, lists six grounds upon 
which an officer may make an arrest without a warrant: 
(1) For a public offense committed in his presence. 
This is obviously not involved in this case. 
(2) When the person arrested has committed a felony,although not in 
his presence. 
Again, a situation which is not involved in the case at bar. 
(3) When he has reasonable cause for believing the person to have 
committed a public offense, although not in his presence. 
This subsection would appear to be the one the State uses to justify the arrest 
in this case. A discussion of this point follows this summary of the statute. 
(4) When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable 
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it. 
This subsection cannot reasonably apply to this situation where the officer did 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not know the equipment in the van was stolen at all, let alone that it came 
from an apparently burglarized apartment. Furthermore, the officer had 
determined only that an apartment had been broken into, not that a theft 
had been committed, a fact essential to make the crime a burglary, Utah 
Code Annotated , §76-6-206 (1953), as amended, makes a person who enters 
a building unlawfully guilty of the crime of criminal trespass, a class B 
misdemeanor. Therefore, this subsection is not applicable without the 
officers knowledge that a theft had been committed. 
(5) On a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the 
commission of a felony by the person arrested. 
This subsection is not applicable because no other person made such a charge. 
(6) At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe he 
has committed a felony. 
Since this was a daytime occurence (2:30 p. m.) this subsection is clearly 
not applicable. 
This indicates an anomaly in the Utah statutes. The legislature has 
given officers authority to "detain" if they have probable cause but would permit 
the officer to arrest (77-13-3) upon what would appear to be the lower standard 
of "reasonable cause". There may be no legal distinction between these two terms; 
but if there is , then it would seem that probable cause is the higher standard. 
Thus, the State may not rely on the authority of the detention statute to authorize 
a detention upon a lesser showing than that of probable cause. If any other 
interpretation is given to this statute, Defendant submits that enactment of Section 
77-13-33, as it is presently written would have been totally unnecessary because given 
the three statutory requirements for stopping the person and asking his name, etc. 
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the officer could execute a "technical arrest" of the person. Surely he should 
need no authority to make a lesser intrusion upon the person's privacy and 
security if he merely desired to obtain his name, address, and an explanation of 
his actions. The statute (77-13-34) granting authority to search for weapons 
would likewise be unnecessary because a search for weapons could be made 
as incident to an arrest, but may be necessary for situations wherein the 
person is not arrested. 
At the time Deputy Hanks formulated the intent to detain the defendants 
and took action to accomplish that end (i. e. requesting the dispatcher to send 
a city officer to his location to detain the defendants while he looked for a 
"possible burglary") he knew the following facts: 
1.. Defendant Davis and his companion had been in another part of 
town approximately ten minutes earlier; 
?. Defendant Davis was known to Deputy Hanks, but the driver of 
the vehicle, Defendant Walker, was unknown; 
\ Both defendants had a prior arrest; 
4. The vehicle had pulled out of an apartment complex; 
5. Defendant Davis waved to him in response to his wave; 
6. Defendant Walker pulled the bus to the curb behind the police car 
and Davis exited the vehicle and approached Deputy Hanks; 
7. The driver of the vehicle (Walker) had a valid drivers license; 
-14-
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Surely these facts alone are insufficient to constitute tTprobable cause" for 
detention under Section 77-13-33. Even at the time Officer Crockett and his 
partner arrived at the scene and were instructed to MwatchM the defendants while 
Hanks left and went looking for a T'possible burglary, " only four additional facts 
are known: 
1. Davis told him they had been visiting a friend in the apartment complex; 
2. There was stereo equipment in the back of the van; 
3. The van was not registered to Defendant Davis; 
4. Davis, a passenger, made an unsolicited statement about his lack 
of knowledge concerning the stereo equipment in the van. 
These facts, in essence, constituted the total quantum of Deputy Hanks' know-
ledge concerning the defendants and their relationship to the stereo equipment, 
the van, and the apartment complex. Surely these marginal facts cannot be 
construed to constitute "probable cause" (required for detention under 77-13-33) 
or "reasonable cause" (required for arrest under 77-13-3 (3). The most 
apparent reason for the non-existence of probable cause is that the officer had 
no knowledge a crime had been committed, much less that it had been committed 
by the defendant. Reliance by the State upon the Draper v. United States, 358 
U. S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959) allowing detention because the officer can articulate 
"specific facts" is misapplied in this case because here all the specific facts 
are "outwardly innocent"; Henry v. U. S., 361 U. S. 98 at 103 (1959); in Draper 
the acts were certainly suspicious. 
In State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P. 2d 772 (1969), this Court 
defined the requirement for probable cause for a warrantless arrest in accordance 
-15-
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with Section 77-13-3 (3) by saying: 
The requirement, as in so many areas of law, is 
one of reason, that it may be shown under the facts and 
circumstances known to the officer, a reasonable and 
prudent man in his position would be justified in believing 
the suspect had committed the offense. 451 P. 2d at 775. 
The quoted sentence has a footnote referring to the early United States Supreme 
Court case of Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642 (1878) where the concept of 
probable cause was considered. The Stacey opinion contains two definitions 
from earlier cases as to what constitutes probable cause. The first from 
Mr. Justice Washington: 
(a) reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances 
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man 
in the belief that the party is guilty of the offense of which he 
is charged. 97 at 645. 
Even when the seizure ("full blown arrest ')occurs at Hanks' return to the place 
where defendants are waiting, the officer only knows two additional facts: 
1. that an apartment has apparently been broken into; and 
2. that the resident upstairs did not see or hear anything. 
It is significant to point out what Officer Hanks does not know at this time. 
He dcss not know if any stereo equipment has been stolen. Thus, the remark made 
by Davis about such equipment and its actual physical presence inside the van 
can have no basis for probable cause to seize (arrest) the defendant for theft 
of stereo equipment. Davis was merely a passenger in a vehicle being driven 
by another. Such lack of knowledge on his part is entirely logical and 
thus the remark cannot be construed to constitute probable cause. 
-16-
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The State relied upon the case of State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 124, 
499 P. 2d 276 (1972) in an attempt to justify the arrest in the case at bar. 
In that case, a Nephi policeman had seen car lights flash on in the Nebo 
Medical Center parking lot at 3 a. m. He then saw the car leaving the parking 
lot. He stopped the car and after he had made a brief investigation as to the 
occupants' identities, he allowed the car to proceed. The officer then returned 
to the clinic and upon investigation, observed a broken window and a door open 
at the clinic. He radioed ahead to other units to have the auto stopped and the 
occupants arrested. In Eastmond, this Court found that the officer had probable 
cause. However, Defendant submits that that case is sufficiently different from 
the case at bar in several key issues relevant to a finding of probable cause: 
1. The lateness of the hour (3 a. m.); 
2. The location, which would not normally have teen-age visitors at 
that late hour; 
3. The officer saw the lights "flash on" and the car drive away from 
the clinic, meaning the lights were "off" before he observed the car, most likely 
to avoid detection; 
4. The officer observed, in plain view, items inherently suspicious: 
a small "doctor's bag" and some small bottles of alcohol. 
These facts, taken together, may have been enough at that point to constitute 
probable cause to arrest , but the officer did not detain the individuals any 
longer; after being told their "explanation" of their actions he allowed the 
vehicle to proceed. Only after he had determined that an offense (a burglary) 
had apparently been committed did he radio ahead and effect the arrest of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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That action should be contrasted with the present case where: 
1. There was a lawful, and not unreasonable or unusual, explanation as 
to the defendants1 presence in the apartment complex parking lot; 
2. A not unusual hour (2:30 in the afternoon) was involved; 
3. The officer saw no items of identifiable contraband or even items which 
might arouse a suspicion that it was contraband. Certainly many more young 
men carry stereo equipment in their automobiles than carry f 'doctorsbags". 
Deputy Hanks was unaware of any offense being committed; yet he (unlike the 
officer in the Eastmond case) seized the defendants and then went looking for 
probable cause. 
The plain view doctrine cannot be relied upon to justify the seizure of 
the stereo equipment because that doctrine is only applicable to items which 
the officer has probable cause to believe is contraband of some nature. 
People v. Miller, 7 Ca. 3d 219, 496 P. 2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 860 
(1972) involved an arrest for an outstanding traffic warrant. At the time of the 
arrest (3 a. m.) the police noticed electronic musical equipment in the back 
of the defendant's van. On appeal for a conviction of possession of marijuana, 
the State attempted to show there were sufficient grounds to arrest the defendant 
for burglary, thereby allowing a more extensive search of the defendant and 
his vehicle than could otherwise be made. The Supreme Court of California 
responded to this assertion as follows: 
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• . . the additional fact that he happened to be carrying 
electronic equipment at that time, would not, in itself, 
support an inference that the equipment had been 
stolen, particularly since the police had not received any 
report of the theft of such material. (Emphasis added) 
496 F. 2d at 1232. 
Such analysis is especially relevant to the present case where the police 
(Deputy Hanks) had received no report of any burglary at the time of the 
initial seizure and even later, when he suspected a burglary had taken place, 
he still did not know there had been a theft of stereo equipment. In fact, 
at the time he initially decides to detain the defendant, Hanks does not even 
know they are carrying the stereo equipment. He only knows they are exiting 
the parking lot of an apartment complex. 
In Remers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 
P. 2d 11, 87 Cal<.Rptr. 202, (1970), the California Supreme Court granted a 
defendant's petition for a Writ of Mandamus to compel suppression of evidence. 
The court there held that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the 
defendant when they saw her reach into her purse and withdraw a t infoil 
wrapped packed which she transferred to another person, who then passed to 
her what appeared to be money. The court felt that such activity was by 
itself innocent and would not constitute probable cause to arrest the individuals 
for drug trafficking. Likewise, it cannot be said that merely carrying stereo 
equipment in the back of a van constitutes probable cause. Certainly more people 
carry items in trucks than pass small packages of tin-foil in exchange for 
money. All such people should not be subject to arrest because the property 
in such vans might be stolen. The Remers court continued: Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as 
with the criminal activity, a detention based on those events is 
unlawful (cases cited); a fortiori, an arrest and search based 
on these events is unlawful, 470 P. 2d at 13. 
The State attempts to elevate Deputy Hanks' simple suspicion to the 
level of probable cause by relying on the knowledge of Officer Hanks that 
Defendant Davis has a criminal record. Such a basis for probable cause is not 
listed in the statutory grounds for arrest . 
In Remers, supra, the California court stated: 
We have held that a prior related conviction, when known by the 
arresting officers, has Mat best only a slight tendency" to 
establish a present violation of the law.. . 470 P. 2d at 16. 
Applied to the facts of the present case, it is apparent Deputy Hanks had no 
probable cause to detain or arrest the defendant. All he knew of was the 
defendant's previous arrest record. Such knowledge cannot be elevated to the 
level of probable cause, for to do so would be to relegate an arrested person to the 
status of second class citizen. Specifically, the Defendant Davis would never in 
his life be allowed to transport in a vehicle any item which might be stolen, 
because any officer who knew he had the prior burglary arrest would be allowed 
to arrest him. Any item he would have might be stolen, thus he is precluded from 
carrying any sizeable personal property, so as to avoid arrest . And it doesn't 
matter that the officer does not know if a theft has been committed; he can merely 
fTholdTt the suspect (that is, tThave him watched") while he goes out looking for an 
apparent burglary and theft; and if he determines there might have been a theft 
or a burglary in the area, then he can arrest that person, even when he doesn't 
know what was taken. The defendant submits that this situation is the very evil 
the framers of the United States and State Constitutions foresaw and sought to Digitiz d by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959), federal officers observed 
one Pierotti, about whom they had received information concerning theft 
from interstate shipments; removing cartons from a residence and 
loading them into his car. The agents took him into custody and seized the 
cartons. It was not until two hours later, after the suspect had been arrested 
and taken to the federal offices, that the agents learned the cartons contained 
stolen radios, not liquors as they had suspected. In Henry the prosecution 
had conceded that the arrest occurred when the officers stopped the automobile. 
The United States Supreme Court said: 
When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their 
liberty of movement, the arrest , for purposes of this case, was 
complete. It is , therfore, necessary to determine whether at 
or before that time they had reasonable cause to believe that 
a crime had been committed. The fact that afterwards contraband 
was discovered is not enough. An arrest is not justified by 
what the subsequent search discloses. (Emphasis added) 
361 U.S. at 103. 
Concerning the issue of probable cause for the arrest , the Court continued: 
On the record there was far from enough evidence against him 
to justify a magistrate in issuing a warrant. . . Riding in the car, 
stopping in an alley, picking up packages, driving away — 
these acts were all acts that were outwardly innocent. 
361 U.S. at 103. 
Certainly it must be conceded that Defendant Davisf activity in leaving the 
apartment complex with the stereo equipment in the van at 2:30 in the afternoon 
was T!outwardly innocent" and thus is not sufficient to constitute probable cause. 
The Court in Henry, supra, at 104, stated that M(t) he police must have 
reasonable grounds to believe the stereo equipment in the van was contraband. " 
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Since he had received no report of any stereo equipment stolen in that area, 
Deputy Hanks' conclusion was merely conjecture. As in Henry, the police did not 
determine the stereo equipment was stolen until some hours later, when the 
Talayuemptuewa's had inventoried their loss and the van had been searched 
subsequent to the arrest and incarceration of the defendants. 
The Henry opinion continues: 
The fact that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough. 
Carroll v. United States, supra, liberalized the rule governing 
searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that decision 
merely relaxed the requirement for a warrant on the grounds of 
practicality. It did not dispense with the need for probable cause. 
361 U.S. at 104. 
Mr. Justice Douglas summed up the entire impact of the court's holding 
in Henry: 
To repeat, an arrest is not justified by what the subsequent search 
discloses. Under our system, suspicion is not enough for an officer 
to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment 
teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than the citizens be 
subject to easy arrest. 361 U. at 104. 
POINT III. 
SINCE THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT WAS UNLAWFUL 
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER 
SUCH ARREST MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
A. ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE VEHICLE PURSUANT 
TO A SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THAT 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS TAINTED BY THE UNLAWFUL ARREST. 
Deputy Hanks testified that after arresting the defendants he caused 
their vehicle to be impounded. He then obtained a search warrant to search 
the vehicle for the items listed by Mrs. Taleumpteuwa as being missing from 
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her apartment,. Over objection of the Defendant Davis, rheseitems were 
3 ntroduced intc evidence agaii ist: 1: ill i i at tr ia - defendant contends that such 
admission war i mo roper because the items were fruit of the poisonous t ree. 
:•, ,, •'-. :rv poisonous t ree" doctrine is an established principle 
ot criminal and constitutional law. m ^ErJ l i 1 1 ' ••_ j i i i - i j --i: — ' ;:-
-T T . Fd. 2:* 441 , <n r r\ <c r • - . ;he !. nited States Supreme Court 
. V I ' ^^t'* 7 i ' , ' - s * ' *"• * I*" l l - .til.: J 
and subsequent confessiu . -ie srandarJ enunciated WHS thai: ::;t e\idencw would 
- , .;.-.^ _ !i i. .: Li^ illegal actions of :nt puiice. ^hi? principle •  
iM> ;rcn followed cv tiic ocan Supreme Court. c-.-•; c ^r t ; v. Piv;nar>- . i Jtah 2d 
•US, 48^ P. 2c 422 v ^ l ) . 
it . v - • ' ;-.(. ." v v . ^ - -. : < 
obtaining of <:ht- evidence is so remote from vie illegal i - :lia: it has become 
attenuated a nci the taint is no longer present. The defendant contends such is 
not rht oresen: C^SL. I "lie eviaence was obtained direct lv v : ---• -
unlawful a r r e s t , nlbeit nursucrr to a search warrant,, 7 he searcn warran: 'AV-
not produced at tlie H * % >*-=•* \ ;- ^ * v tiS 
*~ the introduction of mt t-^uenct. Cms, tnere -A-a^  no rindine ctior le *vrran: 
unlawful a r res t . 
D. i n n M ^ X hK UULL^Kb rOLNO AMONG THE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY OF DEFENDANT DAVIS WHILE INCARCERATED 
WERE "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" AMD WOULD 
HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
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certainly constitute fruit of the poisonous tree. " The only reason the State 
was able to get a warrant to search for that evidence was because the Defendant 
Davis had been illegally arrested. Many serious questions remain unanswered. 
Where was the warrant for the silver coins? What was the probable cause to 
believe the coins would be found only on Davis' person? Why was not the personal 
effects of Walker searched? Had the defendant not been arrested, then clearly 
there could have been no warrant issued for the seizure of the coins because 
such a warrant would have been constitutionally insufficient to "particularly 
describe" the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Had Davis been 
released, where would the officer have been allowed to look for the coins? On 
Davis' person only? His auto? his apartment? Clearly the warrant would have 
failed. The only reason the warrant had any particularity at all was that the 
officer knew that the area of concern was sufficiently limited because 
both defendants were incarcerated in the county jail. Thus, the validity of the 
warrant was directly tied to the arrest of the defendant and the arrest was 
unlawful, having occurred without probable cause. That being so, the evidence 
must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION. 
The improper introduction of evidence against the defendant substantially 
prejudiced his right to receive a fair trial and thus he should be entitled to 
reversal of his conviction and another trial at which the unlawfully obtained 
evidence is excluded. 
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